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DISARMED BY TIME: THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND
THE FAILURE OF ORIGINALISM
DANIEL A. FARBER*

When the Almighty Himself condescends to address mankind in
their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is
rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it
is communicated.
- The FederalistNo. 37 (Madison)
INTRODUCTION

According to the received wisdom, the Second Amendment is
little more than a footnote to the Militia Clauses of the Constitution,
themselves virtually irrelevant to today's military.1
But this
conventional view has been challenged by revisionist scholars.' Now
claiming the title of "standard model" for their own view, the
revisionists contend that the framers had a far more sweeping vision
of the right "to keep and bear Arms." In their view, the Constitution
protects the individual's right to own guns for self-defense, hunting,
and resistance to tyranny.
Unlike Madison, these scholars find no room for uncertainty
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research,
University of Minnesota. Thanks to Dianne Farber, Gil Grantmore, David McGowan, Sandy
Levinson, and Katie Moerke for their helpful comments.
1. A good presentation of this conventional view can be found in Donald W. Dowd, The
Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control Legislation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79 (1979).
For lively, nontechnical introductions to the debate, compare AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN
HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS

170-80 (1998) (favoring recognition of an individual right to bear arms), with GARRY WILLS, A
NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 120-22, 207-20, 253-

59 (1999) (no such right exists).
2. For extensive citations to both the revisionists and their opponents, see 1 LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 897-98 n.211 (3d ed. 2000). For a brief overview
of the debate, see Chris Mooney, Showdown: Liberal Legal Scholars Are Supporting the Right to
Bear Arms; But Will Historians Shoot Them Down?, LINGUA FRANCA, Feb. 2000, at 26. A
bibliography appears in Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 385 app. (2000). Tribe himself now seems to be at least flirting with
the revisionist view, although the tentativeness of his view may be indicated by the fact that he
relegates the point to a somewhat tortuous footnote. See TRIBE, supra, at 901 n.221. I agree
with Tribe's further assertion that acceptance of the revisionist view would be "largely
irrelevant to contemporary gun control proposals." Id. at 902.
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about the historical meaning of constitutional language. "The Second

Amendment," we are told by one scholar, "is thus not mysterious.
Nor is it equivocal. Least of all is it opaque." 3 The meaning of the

"right to bear arms," says another, "seems no longer open to
dispute," and

"an intellectually viable response... has yet to be

made."'

The revisionists' confidence about the original understanding is

the foundation for their reinterpretation of the Second Amendment.5
Yet, the appropriate role of original intent in constitutional law has
been debated for the past two decades. 6 That debate should, if

nothing else, caution against this sense of certainty about the
implications of historical materials for present-day constitutional
issues such as gun control.
This Article will revisit the originalism debate with an eye to the
Second Amendment.7 Part I discusses whether originalism is a
practical approach to constitutional interpretation. Part II assesses
whether originalism is a desirable approach even if it actually could

be implemented. As the title of this Article indicates, originalism's
flaws are thrown into sharp relief by the Second Amendment debate.
3. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43
DUKE L.J. 1236,1250 (1994).
4. Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1259 (1996).
5. See Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 291, 292-93 (2000). A notable exception is L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and
Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997). Although it is not my
purpose here to explore the full range of arguments regarding the Second Amendment, Dorf
makes a strong case against an expansive reading.
6. On the early history of the debate, see Murray Dry, Federalismand the Constitution:
The Founders' Design and Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 233,
233-34 (1987). A summary of the case for originalism, dating from the same era, can be found in
Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on ConstitutionalOriginalism, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY
43 (1987). For a sample of more recent contributions to the debate, see Michael C. Dorf,
IntegratingNormative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of OriginalMeaning, 85
GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997); Gary
Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997); Mark Killenbeck,
The Qualities of Completeness: More? Or Less?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1629 (1999) (book review);
David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the
Supreme Court (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For a leading historian's
perspective, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-22 (1996).
7. For an earlier treatment of the originalism debate, see DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 373-97 (1990). To
highlight the ways in which the Second Amendment falls prey to the classic, well-known
criticisms of originalism, the organization of this essay deliberately tracks the portion of the
1990 book listing those criticisms, with some minor changes in headings. Despite the
organizational similarities, there are only minor overlaps in the treatment of the issues, because
the debate has developed in important ways over the past ten years.
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Reading the historical record on the right to bear arms turns out to be
a difficult exercise, full of perplexities.8 And even if we had a
definitive answer that turned out to favor the revisionists, the claim
that original intent should always trump contemporary legislative
decisions is itself problematic. These defects in originalism are
familiar to constitutional scholars. What may be less familiar is the
almost uncanny way in which these flaws are reproduced in the
literature on the Second Amendment.
Thus, history cannot provide the kind of unshakeable foundation
for gun rights that some scholars have sought. Indeed, there is
something profoundly amiss about the notion that the Constitution's
meaning today should be settled first and foremost by a trip to the
archives. The effort to apply this notion to an issue as contemporary
and hotly contested as gun control only serves to underline the
fundamental peculiarity of the originalist approach to constitutional
law.9
Given the deep flaws in originalism, its continuing appeal may
seem mysterious. For its more sophisticated adherents, as discussed
in Part II, it may appeal as a value-neutral method of decision and as
a solution to the counter-majoritarian difficulty-perhaps a solution
they would admit to be flawed, yet better than the alternatives. As
Part II explains, these arguments are ultimately unsatisfactory. For
less sophisticated adherents, however, originalism may have another,
more visceral appeal. It harkens back to an earlier, purer age, when
today's petty political concerns and squalid politicians were replaced
with great statesmen devoted to high principle. This implicit appeal
to a nobler, more heroic past may have particular resonance in the
context of the Second Amendment, where it brings to mind visions of
minutemen and frontier lawmen valiantly defending justice and
freedom with their guns. These mythic versions of the past, however,
can only obscure the all-too-real issues facing our society today.
Being inspired by myth is healthy; being ruled by it is unsafe.
8. 1 will focus primarily on the Second Amendment itself, rather than the original
understanding of the right to bear arms by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Regardless of how the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right to bear arms, it
seems doubtful that it should apply to the states. In early cases, the Supreme Court refused to
do so. The right to own a gun also does not qualify under the Court's current tests, as "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice," Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968).
9. I do not mean to prejudge the policy issues involved in gun control, which are
themselves hotly disputed. See, e.g., John R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence,and
Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997).
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THE FEASIBILITY OF ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION

Before turning to the question of whether the historical evidence
should control the meaning of the Second Amendment, we may begin
with the question of whether it can be controlling. In short, can
judges and other decision makers determine the "original
understanding" of the Second Amendment in a sufficiently
unambiguous and accurate manner as to justify putting such heavy
reliance on the historical record?
A.

MethodologicalProblems

The first question is whether judges can determine the framing
generation's understanding of the Second Amendment with any
confidence. Various methodological problems may make it difficult
to do so, and, of course, if judges cannot determine original intent,
they cannot make it the basis for interpretation.
Before considering the special problems of interpreting historical
documents from past centuries, it is worth bearing in mind that
interpretation is a difficult task even without these additional
difficulties. The fundamental question is whether someone who
keeps a gun for use in hunting or against burglars is "keeping and
bearing arms" within the meaning of the Second Amendment.10 The
Supreme Court has not found it easy to answer similar questions even
without the extra burden of historical interpretation.
In a series of recent cases, for example, the Supreme Court has
struggled to interpret seemingly commonplace phrases relating to the
use and possession of guns. These cases involved contemporary
statutes with none of the obscurities that impede our understanding
of texts from the more distant past.1 Yet the Supreme Court found
itself deeply divided on basic definitional questions. Is a person with
a gun in the locked car trunk guilty of "carrying a firearm"? Yes,
12
according to five Justices; absolutely not, said the four dissenters.
Does a person under similar circumstances "use" the gun (another
10. The Amendment states that, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
11. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (same); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223 (1993) (same). The relevant portion of the statute imposes minimal criminal penalties for
any person who, in connection with any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, "uses or
carries a firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1999).
12. See Muscarello,524 U.S. 125.
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phrase in the same statute)? No, said a unanimous Court.13 But does
a person who trades a gun for drugs "use" the gun in a drug deal? Six
Justices said yes; Justice Scalia and two others thought this was clearly
wrong.1 4 Such interpretative problems accumulate compound interest
as linguistic understandings and legal contexts shift over time. If we
are not sure what Congress meant only a few years ago by references
to carrying or using a firearm, we are likely to face even greater
difficulties in determining what Congress meant two centuries ago by
the phrase "keep and bear Arms."
Indeed, the historical inquiry required by originalism is not an
easy one, as Justice Scalia has explained:
[I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original
understanding of an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires
the consideration of an enormous mass of material .... Even
beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the reliability of that
material .... And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the
political and intellectual atmosphere of the time .... It is, in short,
a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.15
Justice Scalia cannot be accused of overstating the burden that
originalism places on judges. The difficulty of the necessary research
is not to be minimized. To begin with, the historical record, while
voluminous in some respects, is incomplete just where it would be
most helpful. As background to the Second Amendment, we would
like to know the original understanding of the Militia Clauses of the
Constitution. It would be particularly useful to understand the views
of the specific individuals who drafted or ratified the document. The
documentary record is unsatisfactory on either score. As to the
Constitutional Convention, our best source is Madison's notes. But
the notes are far from being verbatim, including less than ten percent
of the total proceedings.16 The records of the ratification debates are
even worse, regarded by historians as paying scant attention to
accuracy at best. 7 The debates of the First Congress covering the Bill
of Rights-including the Second Amendment-were not recorded at
all in the Senate and were recorded in the House by one Thomas
Lloyd. Lloyd's accuracy had never been good, and by 1789 his
13. See Bailey, 516 U.S. 137.
14. See Smith, 508 U.S. 223.
15. Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1980).
16. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1986).
17. See id. at 22-24. Rakove reports that there were roughly two thousand actors in the
various conventions. See RAKOVE, supra note 6, at 6.
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"technical skills had become dulled by excessive drinking.' 8
Moving beyond the official debates, we also have access to a
flood of published materials debating the Constitution, such as The
Federalist.9 It is often unclear, however, how these materials were
viewed by their readers; indeed, it is not necessarily clear who those
readers might have been. 0 We can also turn to the general
intellectual context, but that too can be difficult to reconstruct and
apply to specific legal issues. 21 In short, the farther we get from the
decision-making process itself, the more material we have available,
but the harder it is to digest this material and evaluate its significance,
particularly for amateur historians such as judges.
Evaluating these materials, along with the earlier American and
English materials that provide their context, is no easy task. Judges,
after all, are not chosen on the basis of their skills as historians-nor,
on the whole, are law professors renowned for the depth of their
historical knowledge of early-American history. 22 By most accounts,
for instance, the Supreme Court's recent rulings on state sovereign
immunity reflect a high degree of historical ineptitude. 23 Historical
interpretation is also made more difficult by the nature of democratic
decision making: For law to be made, a majority or super-majority
must favor it, but they need not agree among themselves about
exactly what it means. Consequently, we have no reason to assume
that any consensus about the meaning of the provision actually
existed.
The difficulty of extracting clear messages from these messy
historical materials is amply illustrated by Second Amendment
scholarship. When examining the contending positions of these
scholars, it is hard not to sympathize with a leading judge's lament
about the difficulty of working with legislative history:
A Sherlock Holmes could work through the clues, and those most
reliable, and draw unerring inferences. Alas, none of us is a worthy
successor to Holmes ....
We hear in the debates what we prefer to
hear-and our preferences differ widely. Even when all of us hear
18. Hutson, supra note 16, at 36.
19. See RAKOVE, supra note 6, at 133.
20. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison'sAudience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999).
21. See RAKOVE, supra note 6, at 18-21.
22. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1250-51 (1986); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of
History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 (1999).
23. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1694-95 (1997).
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the same thing, a search for these clues consumes resources
but
24
does not yield rewards comparable to the effort invested.
This is not to say that historical interpretation is wholly
indeterminate. Rather, it is to question whether historical research is
a viable way for judges and lawyers to find definitive answers to
concrete legal questions.
To fully document this assertion with a detailed analysis of the
historical debate over the Second Amendment would be to write an
article-more likely a book-about Second Amendment history, not
an essay about originalism. But we can begin to see the problems that
judges would confront by considering some of the opposing assertions
that they would have to resolve. Consider, as examples, a half-dozen
of the dueling historical views that the judge would confront:
1. Claim: Madison gave his "imprimatur" to a description of
the Second Amendment by a fellow Federalist, Tench Coxe,
who described it as a guarantee against the confiscation of
private arms.25
Riposte: "Madison's letter is polite and general, not a
discussion of any substantive point Coxe made. " Indeed,
Coxe's treatment of the establishment clause was quite
contrary to Madison's views, but Madison did not mention
26
the disagreement.
2. Claim: The framers did not contemplate extensive gun
regulation: "Well-regulated" meant well drilled or
27
practiced.
Riposte: Every state had substantial gun regulation when the
Second Amendment was adopted.28
3.
Claim: "If any group of persons deserves the label 'pro-gun,'
'29
it is... the Founders themselves.

24. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994).
25. Barnett & Kates, supra note 4, at 1212.
26. WILLS, supra note 1, at 215.
27. Barnett & Kates, supra note 4, at 1208.
28. Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact: New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16
CONST. COMMENTARY 247, 253-56 (1999); see also Don Higginbotham, The Second
Amendment in Historical Context, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 263, 267-68 (1999) (discussing
extensive gun regulation by colonial governments).
29. Barnett & Kates, supra note 4, at 1214.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:167

Riposte: Gun use was not widespread. Only fourteen percent
of the population owned guns (many of which were
30
broken).
4. Claim: "[T]he Framers' militia was not an elite fighting force
but the entire citizenry of the time: all able-bodied adult
white males."31
Riposte: Leaders such as Hamilton and Washington realized
the general militia was impotent and contemplated "a select
corp of moderate size." 32 About forty percent of citizens were
disbarred from militia service because of failure to
demonstrate their loyalty.33
5. Claim: Based on their own revolutionary experience, "the
last thing the Framers would have done is to deny the
3' 4
People the means of armed insurrection.
Riposte: Key framers like Madison, Hamilton, and
Washington were horrified by insurrectionsand intended the
Constitution to provide the means for suppressingthem.35
6. Claim: To "keep" arms in eighteenth-century usage meant
36
to have them in one's personal possession.
Riposte: To "keep" arms in eighteenth-century usage meant
37
to hold them in a communal military arsenal.
Surely, there is much to be written-even more surely, more yet
will be written-on all of these and many other similar issues. The
question is not whether, in the end, some answers to these historical
questions will prove to be more strongly supported by the record than
others. Rather, the question is whether we think judges are likely to
do a very good job in resolving these issues-a good enough job to
justify using historical research as the means of deciding cases

30. See Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep and Bear Arms in the Early Republic, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 269, 274 (1999).
31. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 170.
32. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
309, 343 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 228-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
33. See Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 221, 228-29 (1999).
34. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 175.
35. See WILLS, supra note 1, at 208-10. Key Antifederalist leaders were also horrified at
the thought of insurrection. See Cornell, supra note 33, at 240-41.
36. See Shalhope, supranote 30, at 279-80.
37. See WILLS, supra note 1, at 258-59.
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regarding the Second Amendment or other constitutional issues.38
Given their limited time and training-not to mention their very
mixed record in attempting to identify original intent in other areasit seems hard to be optimistic about the prospects for success by these
amateur historians in black robes.
B.

Was Originalismthe Original Understanding?

The question of originalism can itself be approached from an
originalist perspective by asking whether the framers expected their
intentions to control subsequent interpretation of the Constitution.
This issue seems particularly relevant for the "original
understanding" mode of originalism, which focuses on the way the
text would have been understood by contemporary readers rather
39
than on the intentions of the author.
If such readers were trying to be sure of the meaning of some
part of the constitutional text, they would naturally bring into play
whatever conventions existed at the time for interpreting such texts.
Some, of course, would be general linguistic conventions, common to
the whole community, but others might be more specifically legal.
Thus, an eighteenth-century reader with legal training would
presumably have expected the document to be interpreted in line
with existing legal conventions, and those conventions would enter
into his interpretation. For instance, if he expected the Constitution
to be interpreted based on the views of its framers, such as Madison
and Hamilton, a contemporary reader would have felt entitled to rely
on their public statements, knowing that those statements would also
carry weight with later interpreters. On the other hand, if he
expected interpretation to be more pragmatic, his own understanding
of the text's legal meaning would place more weight on practical
considerations to resolve ambiguities.
Like most historical questions, this one is not free from doubt.
But the best scholarship on the subject suggests that the framing
generation would not have expected interpretation to turn on the
subjective intent of the "authors"-in this case, the drafters and
ratifiers. Indeed, they probably would not have thought extrinsic
38. Originalism should be even less favored by devotees of nonjudicial constitutional
interpretation. For those who view elected officials or ordinary citizens as major constitutional
interpreters, it should seem even less likely that members of Congress or the average voter
would be an astute interpreter of early American history.
39. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 1834 ("[T]he Constitution's meaning is its original public
meaning.").
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evidence, such as the debates of the time, could be considered to
resolve ambiguities.4 0 (The evidence is somewhat less clear on this
point concerning the intent of the ratifiers, as opposed to the drafters
in Philadelphia, 41 but as we have seen, the historical record regarding
the ratifiers' views is much less satisfactory, making reliance on those
views difficult as a practical matter.) Indeed, even at the time,
ratifiers in one state would have had little reason to know what had
been said about the Constitution in the debates elsewhere.
If they would not have looked to the debates as dispositive
evidence, how would the ratifiers or the "reasonable contemporary
reader" have gone about interpreting the text? With respect to the
Second Amendment, one much mooted question is whether the
introductory purpose clause relating to the militia would have placed
some limit on the operational "right to bear arms" clause. 42 Eugene
Volokh argues, for instance, that "the justification clause can't take
away what the operative clause provides. ' 43 On the other hand, the
justification clause might arguably suggest a narrow reading of the
operative clause. Thus, by analogy, the argument for limiting the
First Amendment to explicitly political speech would surely be
strengthened if that Amendment had been written like the Second,
perhaps along the following lines: "A well-informed electorate being
essential to a free state, the freedom of speech and of the press shall
not be abridged."
For the originalist, the question should not be which of these
lines of argument seems plausible today, but rather which
interpretative strategy would have seemed stronger in the 1790s.
Americans had had little experience in interpreting constitutional
provisions at that point, but they were heirs to centuries of experience
in the similar enterprise of interpreting statutes. Reasonable and
well-informed lawyers might well have expected the same methods to
apply to constitutional provisions, and this expectation would shape
their understanding of constitutional language.
40. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 895-98 (1985).
41. See Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 77 (1988).
Rakove argues originalism did not begin as a method of
interpretation until some time after the Constitution had gone into effect. See RAKOVE, supra
note 6, at 339-70.
42. For arguments against finding any such limiting effect, see, for example, Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 466-67 (1995);
Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 1242.
43. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 807
(1998).

2000]

DISARMED BY TIME

Such late-eighteenth-century legal readers might well have
thought that the purpose of a provision could restrict its otherwise
plain language. After a careful review of the early-American cases,
Bill Eskridge found that courts felt free to go beyond statutory
language and resort to the "equity of the statute."' 44 For instance, in
one case, the court said it did not feel "bound by the strictly
grammatical construction of the words of the act" but would instead
adopt a construction "free from those inconveniences which must
flow from any other interpretation. ' 45 Similarly, Blackstone endorsed
the principle that the law ceases where its purpose ends and
maintained that courts must sometimes adapt statutes to
circumstances unforeseen by the legislators. 6 After another careful
look at early Anglo-American practice, John Manning concurred that
resort to the "equity of the statute" was an accepted canon of
statutory construction before the Constitution was adopted, including
"the judge's power not only to extend, but also to restrict, statutory
words in the name of equity. ' ' 47 The possibility of equitable
construction would color a sophisticated reader's approach to the
constitutional text.
In short, to determine the original understanding, we need to
take into account the interpretative methods that a contemporary
reader might have employed. We need to remember, therefore, that
an eighteenth-century reader-whether a member of Congress, a
ratifier, or even a hypothetical reasonable person-would not
necessarily have thought it appropriate to look to the Second
Amendment's legislative history. Such a reader might also have
expected the right to bear arms to be construed restrictively in light of
the express purpose of the Second Amendment to strengthen the
militia.
At the very least, we have no reason to assume away these
possible readings-and even if we would not be inclined to adopt
similar methods of interpretation today, the relevant question for an
44. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509,
1523-26 (1998).
45. Id. at 1525 (citing Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 N.J.L. 213, 214 (1794)).
46. See Eskridge, supra note 44, at 1523-24. Consider, for instance, the old chestnut about
whether someone who murders the testator is entitled to take under the Statute of Wills. See
Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public Policy: The Case of the Murderous Heir, 53 SMU
L. REV. 31 (2000).
47. John F. Manning, The Equity of the Statute (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). Manning, it should be noted, does not agree that today's federal judges are
authorized to engage in equally loose construction, given our current understanding of the
separation of powers.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:167

originalist ought to be what method of interpretation shaped the
understanding of the text by readers of the time. The eighteenth
century was entitled to understand the import of texts in its own way
rather than ours, and if we want to know how those texts were used at
the time, it is those methods of interpretation we must consider. Of
course, this only adds another layer of difficulty to the originalist's
task.
C.

The Ambiguity of "Intent"

Another difficulty of implementing originalism is deciding what
level of intent we are interested in. At the most concrete level, we
might consider the relevant intent or understanding to consist of a
kind of checklist of allowable and prohibited acts-so that the
ordinary reader of the Second Amendment would understand that it
did or did not protect, for example, the use of muskets for hunting.
But this way of thinking about intent is notoriously unsatisfactory. 48
Focusing solely on the concrete applications anticipated by the
framers makes it difficult or impossible to justify decisions, such as
the school desegregation cases, that by common agreement were
correct in their outcomes. 49 As Mike McConnell points out, it is also
important not to "confuse the founders' expectations about how the
nation would be governed under the Constitution with the founders'
understanding of the meaning of the Constitution."' ' 0 Yet, more
abstract interpretations also raise problems. Moving from specific
understandings about particular fact patterns to more general
principles is no easy matter.51 Moreover, once we move away from
explicit consensus about concrete applications to more general
concepts, interpretation can become quite an open-ended process.
For this reason, Judge Bork argued for keeping interpretation at a
relatively low level of generality.5 2 Thus, when we say we are in

48. See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of OriginalMeaning, 86 GEO.
L.J. 569 (1998). For a criticism of Justice Scalia's views on this point, see David Sosa, The
Unintentional Fallacy, 86 CAL. L. REV. 919, 932-36 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997)).

49. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
711-14 (1975).
50. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1490 (1987).
51. See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 463
(1984).
52. See Robert Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828 (1986).
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search of the "original understanding," it is not entirely clear what it
is that we hope to find.
Part L.A considered the problems of determining whether a
particular "intent" or "understanding" is well supported by the
historical record compared to the alternatives. But even once we
surmount those problems, we may discover that this was not, after all,
the kind of intent (or understanding) that we were looking for. As
Jack Rakove points out, much of the debate over the interpretation of
the Second Amendment involves the extent to which we should
restrict ourselves to the specific historical context of enactment, as
opposed to considering the broad theories of government that were
common at the time. 3 The supporters of a narrow interpretation
would prefer to define the original understanding at a low level of
generality, while those seeking a broad interpretation would prefer to
define the original understanding far more abstractly. There is no
agreement on any general principle for choosing the right level of
generality.
Supporters of a narrow construction might also charge their
opponents with confusing expectations with meaning. Even granting
the factual claims made in favor of a broad right to bear arms,
advocates of narrow construction might argue, those factual claims
Suppose, for
are not probative of the original understanding.
example, that the framers did believe that the militia would be
constituted of the entire population and would keep their arms at
home ready for use. Suppose, in addition, that they believed arming
the militia would create a possible check against usurpation by the
federal government and would aid individuals in exercising their
rights to personal self-defense. Still, how do we tell whether these
various beliefs were anything more than predictions about how things
would work out, as opposed to an understanding of the meaning of
the Amendment? If we had asked the framers this question, they
might have thought we were engaging in the kind of hair-splitting
they might have associated with medieval philosophy-yet
implementing originalism requires us to make just these sorts of fine
distinctions.
In the absence of any consensus about how to choose the right
level of generality or distinguish meanings from expectations,
originalists who agree about the historical facts can nevertheless
53. See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 103 passim (2000).
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reach quite different legal conclusions. This makes originalism all the

less likely to constrain judicial interpretation of the Constitution,
which is one of its main goals.
D.

The Problem of Stare Decisis

Most originalists agree that the original understanding is not
everything: originalism must leave some room for the doctrine of
stare decisis. As Henry Monaghan once explained, "The expectations

[created by precedent] render unacceptable a full return to original
intent theory in any pure, unalloyed form"; while "original intent may
constitute the starting point" of interpretation, "some theory of stare
'54
decisis is needed to confine its reach.
More recently, Justice Scalia has also stressed stare decisis as a

limit on originalism. Despite originalism's centrality in his thinking
about judicial review, it plays little role in some of Justice Scalia's

most notable opinions. For instance, he does not apply it to the First
Amendment, an area in which he has been a staunch supporter of
free speech.
He defends his First Amendment decisions as
applications of "long-standing and well-accepted principles (not out
of accord with the general practices of our people, whether or not

they were constitutionally required as an original matter) that are
effectively irreversible.

55

He defends this use of precedent because,

given the existence of an ongoing system of law, originalism cannot
hope to remake the world from scratch and must take as givens such
settled points as the legitimacy of judicial review and the
unconstitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Thus,
Scalia says, "originalism will make a difference ... not in the rolling
back of accepted old principles of constitutional law but in the

rejection of usurpatious new ones.

5' 6

54. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 382 (1981).
For a more extensive discussion, see Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).
55. SCALIA, supra note 48, at 138 (1997).
56. Id. at 139. As examples of novel constitutional rights, Scalia points to:
[C]ases discovering a novel constitutional right against statewide laws denying special
protection to homosexuals, a novel constitutional right against excessive jury awards, a
novel constitutional right against being excluded from government contracts because
of party affiliation, a novel constitutional prohibition of single-sex state schools, and a
novel constitutional approval of federal appellate review of jury verdicts.
Id. His use of these examples is criticized in Jeffrey Rosen, OriginalistSin: The Achievement of
Antonin Scalia, and Its Intellectual Incoherence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26. It is very
difficult to discern any principled distinction between what Scalia considers a novel right and
what he considers merely as novel application of an established one.
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Justice Scalia has also recognized a closely related restraint
against reopening settled questions. Justice Scalia's defense of the
constitutionality of patronage is a good illustration of his use of
tradition. In previous cases, the Court had held that hiring or firing
public employees based on their party affiliation violated their First
Amendment rights.5 7 In two 1996 cases, the Court applied this rule to
government contractors. 8 Justice Scalia's dissent was joined only by
Justice Thomas. Scalia protested that "like rewarding one's allies, the
correlative act of refusing to reward one's opponents... is an
American political tradition as old as the Republic."5 9 In his view,
this history was dispositive:
If that long and unbroken tradition of our people does not decide
these cases, then what does? The constitutional text is assuredly as
susceptible of one meaning as of the other; in that circumstance,
what constitutes a "law abridging the freedom of speech" is either a
matter of history or else it is a matter of opinion. Why are not libel
laws such an "abridgement"? The only satisfactory answer is that
they never were. What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is
breathed into lawyers when they become Justices of this Court, that
enables them to discern that a practice which the text of the
Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people have
regarded as6° constitutional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?
More generally, Scalia insisted (quoting from his own dissent in an
earlier case), "When a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of
the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open,
widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of
the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down. ' 61 Rather
than subjecting such practices to current constitutional doctrines,
"such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the Court's
principles are to be formed. They are.., the very points of reference
by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices is to be
'62
figured out.
As with almost everything about the Second Amendment, there
is controversy about the precise meaning of the current precedents.
Akhil Amar, who has taken an expansive view of the right to bear
57. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
58. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
59. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 688 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 688-89.
61. Id. at 687 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
62. Id. at 687-88 (quoting Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95-96).
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arms, concedes that the lower courts have firmly embraced the

opposing view "that the Amendment was about a militia, not
individually armed citizens," and as a "corollary that there is no

individual right to bear arms. ' 63 The Supreme Court jurisprudence is
less recent and sparser, but is at least not inconsistent with the more
recent consensus in the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court
case most directly on point rejects a Second Amendment defense to a
charge of possessing a sawed-off shotgun on the ground that
''possession or use" of the weapon lacked any "reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated

militia." 64 That opinion is neither recent nor entirely unambiguous.
But the current decisions of the federal circuit courts are unified in
upholding gun control, and the Court has not chosen to revisit the
issue in any of the many recent cases it has decided pertaining to
firearms. In short, no federal gun control law has ever been declared
a violation of the Second Amendment by a federal appellate court.

Does this line of authority, combined with the history of gun
regulation in America, amount to the kind of precedent or "tradition
of our people" that Scalia would respect? The only honest answer is

that no confident answer is possible. Originalism simply offers no
clear-cut answer to the problem of when the need for legal stability
precludes recourse to the original intent. Scalia himself has provided
no clear definition of binding traditions and no rule for applying stare

decisis. What is required is seemingly an act of judgment-just the
65
kind of value judgement that originalism was supposed to avoid.
Perhaps Scalia would find the conventional understanding too
entrenched to challenge; he reached a similar conclusion in the

Eleventh Amendment area, where the conventional understanding
seemed no more solidly established. 66 Until he actually confronts the
63. AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 180; see also Dowd, supra note 1, at 83 n.14 (citing
consistent line of cases in lower federal courts). For illustrative cases, all of which the Supreme
Court has declined to hear, see United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018-20 (8th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993); Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991); Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). The one exception is the recent district court opinion in
United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999). A narrow reading of the
Amendment, however, was adopted at about the same time as Emerson by the D.C. Circuit in
FraternalOrderof Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
324 (1999).
64. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
65. See Dorf, supra note 6, at 1772-74 (arguing that stare decisis intellectually destabilizes
originalism).
66. See Justice Scalia's concurrence in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29
(1989).
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issue, however, it is hard to be sure what he or any other originalist
would actually decide.
II.

NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF ORIGINALISM

Part I cast doubts on whether originalism provides a workable
methodology for judges in deciding Second Amendment cases.
Originalism requires them to make difficult historical judgments with
little training in doing so; it gives no guidance about how concretely
or abstractly to define the original understanding or about how to
distinguish the framers' understanding of the text from their
expectations about its implementation; and it leaves open the difficult
problem of when to relinquish original understandings in favor of
precedent or tradition. Furthermore, as practiced today, originalism
may not even correspond with the methods used by the framers
themselves to understand the text. Consequently, the so-called
"original understanding" may not reflect the understanding of the
original framers of how the provision would be applied under new
circumstances. In short, with the best will in the world, judges who
practice originalism will find themselves in vast disagreement over the
meaning of the Second Amendment. Thus, if originalism is intended
to constrain judges, it is a failure.
But even apart from these difficulties of implementation, the
question remains whether we would want to implement originalism
even if we could. The Second Amendment is a good illustration of
why we should not want to be bound by the original understanding.
Originalists claim that only originalism can reconcile judicial review
with majority rule and make the Supreme Court something other
than a super-legislature. But in reality, the Justices do not need to
give up their bar memberships and join the American Historical
Society in order to do their jobs properly. The conventional methods
of constitutional law are completely legitimate and adequate to the
task at hand. Originalism's greatest failing-in contrast to the
conventional process of common-law decision making-is its inability
to confront historical change. We should reject the originalist's
invitation to ignore all of the history that has transpired since 1790
when we interpret the Constitution.
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MajoritarianismConcerns

Originalism has generally been tied to majoritarianism. 67 As
Edwin Meese once explained it, the logic is simple: "The Constitution
is the fundamental will of the people; that is the reason the
Constitution is the fundamental law." Therefore, "[t]o allow the
courts to govern simply by what it views at the time as fair and decent,
is a scheme of government no longer popular; the idea of democracy
has suffered. '6 Or as John Ely put it, under the originalist view "the
does, which means
judges do not check the people, the Constitution
'69
themselves.
checking
ultimately
are
the people
It seems doubtful that the eighteenth-century ratification process
was democratic enough to support this claim. One of the standard70
criticisms is that it represented only propertied white males.
Moreover, there may be special reasons to be concerned about this
lack of representativeness in connection with the Second Amendment
itself. The Second Amendment may have been not merely "of the
white people" and "by the white people" but also, at least to an
extent, "for the white people."
Carl Bogus has suggested that a major motivation for the Second
Amendment may have been the militia's role in suppressing
resistance by slaves. 71 Most of his evidence is admittedly
circumstantial,7" based on the known weakness of the militia as a
military force73 compared with its usefulness in slave patrols and
putting down slave revolts.7 4 Besides the circumstantial evidence,
however, Bogus does cite at least one disturbing piece of more direct
evidence, in the form of Patrick Henry's concern that Congress might
prevent the use of the state militia "[i]f there should happen an
insurrection of slaves. '75 If Bogus's evidence is not enough to brand
the Second Amendment as proslavery, it is at least enough to remind
67. See RAKOVE, supra note 6, at 9.
68. Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 465 (1986).
69. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 5-8
(1980).
70. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 230 (1980).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See generally Bogus, supra note 32.
See id. at 372.
See id. at 339-42.
See id. at 332-33, 335.
Id. at 349 (quoting 3 DEBATES OF

THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS,

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 421 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891)).
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us that not all of the framers' motives were equally worthy of our
respect.
Quite apart from these specific questions about the Second
Amendment's pedigree, originalism seems to misconceive the
connections between majoritarianism, constitutionalism, and judicial
review. Taking majority rule as the sole foundational constitutional
norm, originalism struggles to justify judicial review as enforcing the
decisions of an earlier and more potent majority. This concern about
majoritarianism is quite understandable. Of course majority rule is
crucial, and of course judges should exercise restraint in reviewing the
work of elected officials. But we have sometimes seemed so
preoccupied with the tension between judicial review and majority
rule that it has threatened to become a fetish.7 6 When judicial review
seemed to be a uniquely American institution, shared by no other
democracy, perhaps it was natural to regard it as an anomaly in
urgent need of justification. Today, this impulse seems anachronistic.
Democratic governments around the world have now adopted
judicially enforceable written constitutions featuring various
protections for individual rights against majority action.77 What is in
need of justification and legitimization now is less judicial review than
its absence.78 We need not mangle our methods of constitutional
76. It is important to bear in mind that courts are not the only nonmajoritarian institutions
in our system of government. Indeed, it is not clear that the Court is radically less "democratic"
than the Senate, which is elected from incredibly malapportioned districts.
As for
accountability, the Court is not the only important national authority lacking direct political
accountability: the Federal Reserve is nearly as free from accountability and arguably more
important in setting national policy. Most Americans are affected more directly by the inflation
and unemployment rates than by whether flag burning is legal or by whether the town hall can
display a Christmas tree.
Furthermore, judges are only part of the governance system; they are not our rulers. To
assume that the whole system can be legitimate only if each part would be legitimate standing
alone is to commit what economists call the fallacy of composition. The attack on judicial
review assumes that the idea of democratic legitimacy applies to each particular organ of
government or each specific governmental policy considered in isolation, as opposed to the
government as a whole. But legitimacy may be better considered a quality that attaches to the
entire governance system rather than components. Even markedly nonmajoritarian features,
like the United States Senate, do not imperil overall democratic legitimacy, though they may or
may not function desirably. For further discussion of these issues, see DANIEL FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (forthcoming 2001).

77. See, e.g., Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 537 (1988). Since Lord Lester wrote, the trend has continued apace.
78. Consider an analogy. One of the core tenets of the American legal system is the
importance of the jury. We place particular importance upon the jury in criminal cases, but
even in civil cases, the jury's role is protected by the federal Constitution and many state
constitutions. One key function of the jury is to bring community values and judgment to bear
on a case, rather than merely the elite opinions of judges. For this reason, as well as for more
immediate practical reasons, everyone agrees that judges should not lightly overturn jury

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:167

interpretation out of anxiety about the legitimacy of judicial review.
Reliance on the norm of majority rule is a particularly bad
argument for Second Amendment originalism. This argument may
have some appeal when the courts use nonoriginalist reasoning to
strike down laws with broad popular support. In that setting, a turn
toward originalism actually would strengthen majority rule, albeit at
the possible expense of other constitutional values. But here, the
shoe is on the other foot. Second Amendment originalism aims not
to strengthen majority rule but to weaken it by limiting the majority's
right to legislate in an important area of public policy.
Some arguments for a broad reading of the Second Amendment
pose a different kind of threat to majority rule. The "insurrectionist"
argument for the right to bear arms celebrates armed revolt against
the government-reading the Second Amendment to guarantee "the
People's access to bullets as well as ballots."79 In a democracy,
however, this almost inevitably means the right of a minority to rebel
when it sees a threat to its fundamental rights, for the majority can
protect itself quite adequately with ballots.
If we accept the
legitimacy of this minority threat to revolt, we place a restraint on
majority rule. Even apart from the remote chance that the threat will
be implemented, its mere existence places a restraint on majority rule.
It was for this reason that, the last time the insurrectionist card was
played, Lincoln argued that the real question was whether "any
government so constituted" -any government "of the people, by the
people, and for the people"-could long endure, 80 or whether such a
government must inevitably be subject to coercive threats by
disgruntled minorities. If judicial review poses a countermajoritarian
"difficulty," the insurrectionist reading of the Second Amendment
threatens a counter-majoritarian debacle.
The effort to equate the original understanding with the will of
the people, and to equate both with constitutionalism, is dubious in
any event. In the context of the Second Amendment, however, it is
particularly tenuous.

verdicts. Still, not infrequently, judges do overturn jury verdicts that they consider unsupported
by the evidence. But no one obsesses about the "counter-juritarian" difficulty. No scholar finds
it necessary to design a whole theory of civil procedure around the problem of explaining the
legitimacy of this practice.
79. See AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 171.
80. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 429 (Henry Steele Commanger ed., 9th ed. 1973).
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B.

The Nature of the Judicial Role

Other arguments for originalism rest on the nature of the judicial
role. Justice Scalia argues that originalism, despite its problems, is the
only way to restrain judicial discretion. Speaking of the traditional
common-law approach to judging, he says that it "would be an
unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has
developed in recent centuries, called democracy. ' 81 Scalia's main
priority is properly confining the role of judges-as he says in his
response to Professor Gordon Wood: "I am sure that we can induce
judges, as we have induced presidents and generals, to stay within
their proper governmental sphere. ' '82 Note in this regard that one of
his main arguments for originalism is that it counters the tendency of
judges to be swayed by their personal predilections, which he calls the
"principal weakness of the system."83
But Scalia is too quick to dismiss the common-law method, which
is a central feature of American constitutional law. 84 Even some
writers with a strong originalist bent, like Michael McConnell, seem
to acknowledge a role for common-law evolution.85 At least since
Karl Llewellyn - if not since Holmes-American legal pragmatists

have defended just this type of common-law reasoning.
The fullest recent attempt to justify this process comes from Cass
Sunstein. 86 He argues that we often make the best collective decisions
(particularly collectively) on the basis of what he calls incompletely
theorized agreements. 87 These agreements represent a consensus on
the proper outcome in a given case, with only a partial attempt to
work out a theoretical justification. 88 These incompletely theorized
agreements are particularly prominent in law-enough so that for
many lawyers, the only odd thing about the idea of an incompletely
theorized agreement is that it seems to imagine the possibility of the
81. SCALIA, supra note 48, at 9.
82. Id. at 133.
83. Scalia, supra note 15, at 864.
84. See David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996).
85. See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1269, 1292 (1997).
86. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996).
87. See id. at 4-5.
88. See id. Sunstein is far from alone in advocating this pragmatic approach. For other
prominent examples, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990);
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962).
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other kind! (What lawyer has ever negotiated a completely theorized
agreement or even had reason to read one? Indeed, one of the least
plausible aspects of the recent efforts to expand the Second
Amendment is the attempt to portray it as embodying a complete
theory of government.) As Sunstein explains, agreement about legal
issues often "involves a specific outcome and a set of reasons that do
not venture far from the case at hand. High-level theories are rarely
reflected explicitly in law. 89
Someone once defined an economist as someone who tries to
prove that what is actually happening is theoretically possible. The
efforts of legal philosophers to validate the common-law method have
something of this flavor. The fact is that English courts have been
using this method since the Middle Ages, and our Supreme Court has
been deciding cases without the benefit of a grand theory since it
issued its first opinion. It seems a little late in the day to argue that
the method does not work. Orville and Wilbur may not have known
much aeronautical theory, but the plane did get off the ground.
The real concern of the originalists is not that the process is
nonfunctional but that it gives judges too much leeway. 90 Judges do
have leeway, which they sometimes exercise in ways that not all of us
like. But this is a condition without a cure, other than simply killing
the patient. In particular, originalism will not cure the problem of
judicial discretion. In practice, recourse to original intent simply fails
to place sharp constraints on judges. Scalia himself has not succeeded
in purging his own decisions of personal value judgments, which
flourish despite his attachment to originalism. 91 Nor have the efforts
of other members of the Court been successful in this regard-for
instance, in the Eleventh Amendment area, the Court has come to
historical conclusions that are almost unanimously rejected by
scholars.

92

89. SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 37.
90. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Moment and the Millennium: A Question of Time, or Law?,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1112, 1117 (1998) (explaining that textualists are "tenaciously devoted
to an ideal of legitimacy that requires judicial decision making to be constrained by objective
standards and criteria external to the judges themselves").
91. See David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics:An Exploration of Scalia'sFidelity
to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1377-1426 (1999). According to
Zlotnick, "Scalia's opinions ... can be best understood as the product of the three-way tension
between a faithful application of his methodology, the ideological motivation for the
methodology, and his distinct conservative political values on particular issues." Id. at 1425.
92. As Carlos Vazquez has observed, there is a "rare unanimity" among legal scholars that
the Eleventh Amendment decisions are unsupported by original understanding. See Vazquez,
supra note 23, at 1694.
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The Second Amendment once again provides an apt illustration
of the defects of originalism. If the original understanding is to
constrain judicial discretion, it must be possible to ascertain that
understanding in a reasonably indisputable way. But, as we saw in
Part I.B, it is not even possible to give a clear-cut definition of what
constitutes the original "understanding," as opposed to the original
''expectation" or the original "applications" associated with a
constitutional provision. And having cleared that hurdle, formidable
difficulties confront the originalist judge, as we saw in Part I.Aincluding a historical record that combines enormous volume with
frustrating holes in key places, a complex intellectual and social
context, and a host of interpretative disputes. If we do not trust
judges to correctly interpret and apply their own precedents-a skill
which they were supposedly taught in law school and have practiced
throughout their professional lives-it is hard to see why we should
trust them to interpret and apply a mass of eighteenth-century
archival documents.
C. Fidelity and Change
Originalism is an effort to fix the meaning of the Constitution
once and for all at its birth. But there is an opposing view, one most
eloquently expressed by Justice Holmes:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.
It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years
experience
93
ago.

The Second Amendment is among the provisions of the Constitution
that seem most to call out for Holmes's approach-for the historical
changes relating to the right to bear arms have been far-reaching
indeed.
93. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). For modern defenses of this concept, see
Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998);
Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627 (1997).
Although the idea of an evolving constitutional regime is often considered liberal, it can also be
defended as the truest embodiment of conservatism. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering
Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation,72 N.C. L. REV. 619
(1994).
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Some of those changes relate directly to the two subjects of the
Second Amendment: firearms and the militia. There is first of all the
disappearance of the kind of militia contemplated by the framers. As
Akhil Amar explains, perhaps with some regret:
[T]he legal and social structure on which the amendment is built no
longer exists. The Founders' juries-grand, petit, and civil-are
still around today, but the Founders' militia is not. America is not
Switzerland. Voters no longer muster for militia practice in the
town square. 94
Another relevant change is the development of professional police
departments, which limit the need for individuals and groups to
engage in self-help. 95 Because these changes, unanticipated by the
framers, undermined the asserted original purpose of the Second
96
Amendment, its application today becomes problematic.
Apart from these changes relating directly to the Second
Amendment's subject matter, broad changes in the constitutional
landscape are also relevant. One watershed is the Civil War, which
undermines the insurrectionist argument that armed revolt is a
constitutionally sanctioned check on federal power. 97 Perhaps one
should just say that the constitutionality of insurrection was decisively
rejected. One might even cite in this regard the decisive ruling on this
point at the Appomattox courthouse in the case of Grant v. Lee -a
"ruling" of more decisive constitutional importance than many a
Supreme Court decision or even some constitutional amendments.
Perhaps there may be those who reject the validity of the
decision at Appomattox even today. What cannot be disputed as a
lesson of the Civil War, however, is that insurrection is not an
acceptable practical check on the federal government. Quite apart
from the question of whether insurgents could defeat a modern army,
the Civil War suggests that the costs of exercising this option would
simply be unbearable: if a similar percentage of the current
population died during such an insurgency today, we would be talking
about five million deaths. 98 Brave talk about insurrection is one thing;

94. Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts: What the Right to Bear Arms Really Means, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 12, 1999, at 24, 26.
95. See Dorf, supra note 5, at 320-23.
96. On the effect of these changed circumstances, see H. Richard Uviller & William G.
Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate,76 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 403, 537-49 (2000); see also Dorf, supra note 5, at 320-23.
97. See Dorf, supra note 5, at 318-20.
98. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, DRAWN WITH THE SWORD: REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 57 (1996).
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"paying the butcher's bill" is quite another. Perhaps the framers can
be forgiven for failing to appreciate this reality; it is harder to excuse
similar romanticism today.
The Civil War also transformed our concept of the relationship
between the state and federal government. The Second Amendment,
at least if revisionist scholars are to be believed, was based on the
threat a powerful national government posed to liberty. But one
effect of the Civil War was to cement the federal government's role as
a guarantor of liberty. Since the time of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than state and local communities being seen as bulwarks of
freedom against the federal leviathan, the federal government has
The Fourteenth
been pressed into service to defend liberty.
Amendment arose in part out of a sense of the obligation of the
federal government to protect the rights of its citizens, by force if
necessary, whether the threat came from a foreign nation or a state or
local government. 99
Thus, rather than entrusting liberty to the "locals," the
Fourteenth Amendment calls into play federal judicial and legislative
power to ensure that the states respect individual rights. This
realignment of the federal government as friend rather than threat to
liberty underlies much of our modern Supreme Court jurisprudence
and a plethora of twentieth-century civil rights legislation. This
fundamental reassessment of the relationship between federal power
and liberty would make independent state and local militias as much
a threat to liberty as a protector.
If the insurrectionist argument is at odds with the lessons of the
Civil War, the self-defense argument for constitutional protection
clashes with the modern regulatory state. It is a commonplace that
the New Deal was a "watershed" in the development of the
regulatory state, 1' ° enough so to lead one prominent theorist to build
a whole theory of constitutional interpretation around this shift. 01
But the New Deal was only the beginning. In the 1960s and 1970s
came a new wave of legislation covering matters such as consumer
protection, discrimination law, and the environment. 10 2 As a result,
we live in a world where citizens routinely rely on the federal
99. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 301-05.
100. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1189, 1192 (1986).
101. The reference, of course, is to BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991).

102. For a survey of these developments, see Rabin, supra note 100, at 1272-95.
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government rather than self-help to protect them against a host of
threats.
Today, we expect federal protection against everything from
potentially dangerous traces of pesticides in our foods to unwanted
sexual overtures in the workplace. In this context, the notion that the
government cannot protect us from the dangers of firearms seems like
an odd relic of an earlier laissez-faire period. Indeed, it seems
peculiar at best to say that the government can constitutionally
protect us from one kind of hostile environment- coworkers
displaying lewd pictures-but not from a more dramatic kind of
hostile environment-neighbors carrying Uzis.
The point here is not that the Second Amendment is an
anachronistic text that ought to be ignored, or that its interpretation
should necessarily be narrowed in light of these later developments.
It is not even that these later developments are fundamentally
correct. What is wrong with originalism is that it seeks to block
judges from even considering these later developments, which on
their face seem so clearly relevant to the legitimacy of federal gun
control efforts. But try as they may, it seems unlikely that judges can
avoid being influenced by these realities.
CONCLUSION

What do we learn about originalism from the Second
Amendment debate?
What do we learn about the Second
Amendment from the originalism debate?
One set of lessons relates to constitutional interpretation. The
Second Amendment shows how the standard academic criticisms of
originalism are not just academic quibbles: they identify real and
troubling flaws. The debate about the Second Amendment vividly
illustrates critical problems with originalism:
* The historical record concerning the right to bear arms is
difficult for non-historians such as judges to evaluate,
requiring a high level of historical expertise to evaluate the
credibility and import of the evidence.103
* Originalism might not accurately reflect the way in which
contemporary readers understood the document; in
particular, it may underestimate their willingness to
contemplate limiting the "right to bear arms" clause in light
103. See supra Part I.A.
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of the purpose clause.01
*
The original understanding of the Second Amendment can
be defined at different levels of generality, and the
interpretation will depend on the choice of level as well as
on how we distinguish the original "understanding" from
mere original "expectations."'10 5
*
Originalism, to be a realistic option, must acknowledge stare
decisis, yet it does not provide us with clear guidance about
whether the current Second Amendment case law should
stand. 0
*
Although originalism claims simply to be enforcing the will
of "We the People," the Second Amendment shows how
originalism can undermine majority rule. 107
*
Because of the difficulties judges would face in basing their
decisions on purely historical grounds, originalism would not
eliminate the role of personal values in judging. 108
*
Originalism forces us to ignore the ways our world has
changed since the eighteenth century: the Civil War and its
aftermath have cut the ground away from the notion of
insurrection as a protection of liberty against federal power;
and the New Deal and its aftermath have created a world in
which we customarily turn to the regulatory state rather
than to self-help to protect ourselves from threats. 10 9
It would, in short, be a serious mistake for judges to use
originalism as their recipe for interpreting the Second Amendment or
other ambiguous constitutional language.
The fact that the
arguments against this approach are familiar does not make them any
less damaging.
At a more fundamental level, however, the lesson is not simply
that originalists are wrong about how judges should read the
Constitution. More importantly, they are wrong about the nature of
the Constitution itself. In general, disputed constitutional provisions
cannot simply be applied on the basis of whatever examples were
discussed at the time, and so it is natural for originalists to attempt,
instead, to reconstruct the theories underlying those provisions. This
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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effort to theorize constitutional provisions is quite evident with the
Second Amendment originalists we have discussed," 0 but it is equally
clear in the efforts of other originalists to find in the original
understanding some unified theory of executive power or of
federalism. But to look for an underlying theory is to misconceive the
nature of the constitutional enterprise. Unlike physics, law does not
lend itself to a "standard model" or a grand unified theory.
While the framers were indeed "concerned with such
fundamental questions as the nature of representation and executive
power,""' they were also engaged in "a cumulative process of
bargaining and compromise in which a rigid adherence to principle
yielded to the pragmatic tests of reaching agreement and building
coalitions."11 2 In short, they were doing their best to create a viable
set of democratic institutions, a task that required the utmost
attention to both principle and pragmatism. Their task was not to
agree on a theory but to create the basis for a working democracy.
We hardly do justice to the spirit of their undertaking if we treat the
resulting document as their Constitution alone rather than being ours
as well. The last thing they would want would be for us to be ruled by
false certainties about their intentions. Unfortunately, that is an
invitation we have received all too often with respect to the Second
Amendment.

110. See Rakove, supra note 53, at 143-52, passim (discussing use of high-level theoretical
constructs by advocates of a broader reading of the Second Amendment).
111. RAKOVE, supra note 6, at 14.
112. Id. at 15.

